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Conceptual Formulation
To keep overall system cost low, embedded processors frequently omit a Memory Manage-
ment Unit (MMU) trading security for system cost. Hence, a typical embedded operating
system as uClinux cannot realize virtual memory. This is common practice for embedded
real-time systems, because virtual memory causes unpredictable execution timing.
The Analog Devices BlackFin DSP Architecture offers limited functionality for memory
access control without providing the base for virtual memory. Therefore, the first and main
goal of this thesis is to design and realize an adequate security model which implements
the BlackFin security capabilities for uClinux. Among the questions to be answered are
the following:
1. Shall individual applications be isolated from each other or is it sufficient to isolate
the kernel domain from the applications domain?
2. What additional overhead is incurred by the developed security model?
Secondly it should be analyzed, whether a similar security model can be established for an
RTAI-patched uClinux and for Lightweight RTAI respectively. This would be a first step
towards enhanced security in real-time operating systems.
Because the BlackFin MMU also controls the behavior of the processor’s caches it seems
reasonable to additionally design an experimental interface to uClinux to influence caching
by the operating system or even by application programs and try to make system timing
more predictable.
Last but not least, whereas ADEOS and RTAI are available for BlackFin, Lightweight
RTAI is not. Because the effort seems reasonable, that porting should be part of the prac-
tical work, too.

Abstract
In the past, embedded system’s security has been often omitted in order to trade it for sys-
tem cost and more predictable execution timings. Due to the pressure induced by increased
networking and multitasking, this issue is getting more important. Therefore, Analog De-
vices’ Blackfin processor, which combines capabilities of signal processing and control-
ling, additionally provides means for memory protection.
The operating system uClinux, which is especially suitable for embedded systems because
support for Virtual Memory has been removed, has already been ported to the Black-
fin architecture, but still lacks support for memory protection. Thus, the main effort of
this thesis consists of analysing Linux’s memory management, reimplementing similar ap-
proaches into the uClinux kernel, and measuring the resulting overhead.
The implemented protection scheme does secure both particular processes and kernel
space. Even if it is still in a prototypical state, memory protection is fully functional.
In addition, approaches for exclusive kernel protection and reducing interrupt latency are
discussed.
Kurzreferat
In Verbindung mit eingebetteten Systemen spielte Sicherheit in der Vergangenheit eher
eine untergeordnete Rolle. Im Vordergrund standen vorhersagbare Ausführungszeiten
und der finanzielle Rahmen. Aufgrund der zunehmenden Vernetzung und der Konzen-
tration mehrerer Anwendungen auf einen Prozessor gewinnt dieser Gesichtspunkt jedoch
stärker an Bedeutung. Der Blackfin-Prozessor des Herstellers Analog Devices, welcher
die Konzepte vonMikrocontroller und digitalem Signalprozessor in sich vereint, entspricht
diesem Trend, indem er die Möglichkeit des Speicherschutzes integriert.
Das Betriebssystem uClinux wurde speziell auf die Bedürfnisse von eingebetteten Syste-
men angepasst, da es im Gegensatz zu Linux keinen virtuellen Speicher unterstützt. Es
wurde zwar bereits auf die Architektur des Blackfin Prozessors portiert, verfügte jedoch
bisher nicht über nennenswerte Mechanismen zum Schutz des Speichers. Der Haupt-
teil dieser Diplomarbeit besteht deshalb darin, Linux’ Speicherverwaltung zu analysieren,
einen ähnlichen Ansatz in uClinux zu implementieren und schließlich ihren Einfluss auf
die Leistung des Systems zu ermitteln.
Die entstandene Realisierung schützt sowohl den Speicher einzelner Prozesse als auch den
des Betriebssystemkerns. Obwohl die Lösung im Moment noch prototypischen Charak-
ter besitzt, ist sie bereits voll funktionsfähig. Des Weiteren diskutiert die Arbeit auch den
Ansatz des alleinigen Kernel-Schutzes und unterbreitet einen Vorschlag zur Verringerung
der Interrupt-Latenzzeit.
Declaration of Authorship
I hereby declare that the whole of this diploma thesis is my own work, except where
explicitly stated otherwise in the text or in the bibliography.
This work is submitted to Chemnitz University of Technology as a requirement for being
awarded a diploma in Information Technology. I declare that it has not been submitted in
whole, or in part, for any other degree.
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1 Introduction
As embedded systems are getting more and more connected to each other, and even in-
ternet access is required for some of them, there is an increasing need for security with
respect to the particular network interfaces. Besides these external threats, financial con-
straints impose a rising number of tasks to be scheduled at one processor. While this might
even consist of several cores, all applications refer to the same main memory. Therefore,
ensuring system integrity is especially an issue of providing memory protection.
Whereas the implementation of a MMU has been omitted, due to timing and financial rea-
sons, for most embedded processors, either microcontrollers or Digital Signal Processors
(DSPs), Analog Devices’ Blackfin processor supports memory protection without depend-
ing on the extensive mechanisms of Virtual Memory.
In order to provide memory protection to the embedded operating system uClinux, hence
preparing it for the rising needs in security, the present Blackfin port has to be aug-
mented.
After having managed this in conjunction with uClinux, a similar attempt, even if suited
to real time issues, is to be implemented for the real time extension RealTime Application
Interface (RTAI) and the stand-alone real time solution Lightweight RTAI.
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2 State of the Art
2.1 Memory Management in Linux
In order to understand uClinux’s memory management and thus to be able to implement
memory protection, the first step consists of studying Linux’s memory management as
it is the direct ancestor of uClinux’s one, and documentation for uClinux is rare. Since
memory management depends also on a specific hardware, this is done in conjunction
with the common i386 architecture.
The main issues which are to be revealed correspond to the following two questions:
1. How does the Linux kernel organize its own memory?
2. Which data structures does it use in order to store the access rights for the memory
areas of the particular processes?
Even if our focus is on memory protection, we can not omit the concept of Virtual Memory
(VM) as both are deeply meshed.
2.1.1 Page Tables
As already mentioned, memory management is always based on a specific processor and
its implementations towards virtualization of memory and memory protection. For the
i386 processor both relies on its paging mechanism.
Paging denotes the ability to provide chunks of consecutive virtual addresses, referred to
as pages, which can be mapped to arbitrary locations in physical memory, referred to as
page frames. This enables the kernel to assign large blocks of memory to a process while
the actual data can be scattered over the physical memory or even be swapped out to disk.
Moreover, it is possible to enlarge a previously assigned block without depending on free
memory in a particular place. In order to apply access rights, these are attached to each
particular page. In conjunction with the i368 processor each page consists of 4KB.
A dedicated piece of the processor’s hardware, the MMU, has to relocate virtual to physical
addresses and enforce the given access rights at each memory access. Therefor, it requires
an efficient infrastructure.
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This is organized in three stages:
• Dedicated buffers, by which the processor holds a set of page-to-page-frame map-
pings and the accordant access rights, called Translation Lookaside Buffers (TLBs).
• Assignment tables residing in main memory, which are traversed by the processor in
order to fill its TLBs, but managed in software. They are referred to as page tables.
• As page tables are hold especially for the processor, they are not the place where
Linux manages its access rights and memory mappings. This is done in hardware-
independent data structures, which are handled in sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3.
In order to understand the mechanisms in which these hardware-independent data struc-
tures are transformed into page table entries, we should, at first, have a closer look at the
page tables. A comprehensive description can be found in the book ’Understanding the
Linux Kernel’ [BC06] on pages 45-78.
Processes
As every process has its own virtual address space, it has its own page tables, too. Regard-
ing the 32-bit architecture of the i386 processor, this address space has an upper limit of
3GB, while the fourth gigabyte is reserved for the kernel. Since this virtual address space
is never fully exploited by a single process, page tables are split up into two levels, hence
reducing their memory footprint.
Having virtual private address spaces does also mean that different processes accessing the
same address need not refer to the same page frame in memory. In fact, even accesses to
different pages may refer to the same physical address.
Kernel
Since switches to kernel mode do not just occur if a process attempts a system call, but are
required in case of each interrupt handler, it would be inefficient to handle separate page
tables for the kernel mode. Therefore, kernel control paths run on behalf of the current
process, thus using the same page tables. For this reason, the fourth gigabyte of each
process’s address space is reserved for the kernel.
The major part of this space does just linearly map the first 896MB of physical memory. If
the kernel needs to access page frames beyond this boundary, referred to as high memory,
it has to instantiate temporary non-linear mappings in the remaining 128MB of address
space.
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2.1.2 Memory in Kernel Domain
From the kernel’s point of view memory splits up into page frames which are permanently
assigned to the kernel and page frames which can be dynamically assigned to either pro-
cesses or dynamic data structures of the kernel. In order to reimplement memory protection
into uClinux, it is important to know whether a page frame belongs to the kernel, and thus
has to be protected from user accesses, or not.
Handling the static kernel page frames is easy. They are tracked by the constant address
labels __stext, __etext, __sdata, __edata, ___bss_start, and ___bss_stop, which enclose the
kernel’s code, initialized data, and uninitialized data, respectively.
Thus the question to be answered in this section is:
• Which data structures are used to track the kernel’s dynamic page frames?
In order to answer it, we have to consider the three ways in which Linux requests memory.
These essentially are:
Page Frame Management is used to ask for chunks of contiguous page frames. This
is done by the function __alloc_pages(). As the underlying algorithm is the Buddy
System (see page 311 in [BC06]), which implements a power-of-two allocator, the
assigned chunks always consist of 2n page frames.
Memory Area Management is used to ask for smaller memory areas; especially, if these
are frequently allocated. The corresponding function interface is kmalloc(). Memory
Area Management is realized by means of the SLAB allocator (see page 323 in
[BC06]), which in turn relies on the Page Frame Management.
Noncontiguous Memory Area Management provides a measure to request contiguous
pages made up of non-contiguous page frames, thus avoiding external fragmenta-
tion. In order to use single page frames, which are obtained from Page Frame Man-
agement, it has to map them into the upper 128MB of each process’s address space.
It can be called by the function vmalloc().
In whole, these mechanisms are discussed on pages 294-350 in [BC06]. Besides private
data structures, they rely on three major data structures, which are handled in the remainder
of this section.
Buddy Lists
As each of the three ways in which the kernel allocates memory is calling the Buddy
Allocator, its lists are especially interesting. There is one list for every chunk size the
allocator is able to deliver. However, as these lists only contain chunks of the remaining
free memory, they are not suitable for determining the kernel’s page frames.
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Page Descriptors
Additionally, the kernel holds a large data structure, which contains one page descriptor for
each of the page frames. It is called the Page Descriptor Table (PDT). The page descriptors
can, e.g., be used to distinguish dynamic memory from unusable or static kernel memory.
In addition, they provide information about page frames which belong to the Memory Area
Management, but they do not serve as a basis for determining the kernel’s page frames in
general.
Master Kernel Page Tables
As the kernel uses the fourth gigabyte of each process’s address space, its mappings have
to be distributed to the page tables of all processes, and thus, it needs master kernel page
tables as a common data base. However, it is impossible to distribute new entries to all
processes, immediately. Therefore, this is deferred by means of the Page Fault Exception
Handler (see section 2.1.4), which is called whenever the processor encounters an empty
page table entry, and which uses the master kernel page tables as reference.
In order to restrict page faults to non-linear mappings, which are temporarily mapped, all of
the linear mappings of the first 896MB are inserted into the master kernel page tables dur-
ing the initialization phase of the kernel. In addition, they are copied to each process’s page
tables at the process’s creation time. In order to reduce their memory footprint and save
TLBs, the linear memory mappings use huge pages of 4MB (see page 51 in [BC06]).
According to their size and immutability, they are not suitable for deriving information
about locations of kernel page frames. They admit read and write access to the kernel for
every location in the first 896MB of memory. Also the temporary non-linear mappings of
the upper 128MB are useless in that sense. They are changed by Noncontiguous Memory
Area Management and Page Frame Management. The latter needs them to grant access
to high memory. For further information about the self-acting distribution of non-linear
mappings see page 350 in [BC06].
With reference to the initial question of this section, we can conclude:
• There exist some global data structures, but these are not sufficient in order to track
the kernel’s page frames in general.
2.1.3 Management of User Memory
While memory requests from kernel space are satisfied immediately, those from user space
are treated non-urgent and non-trustable. They are deferred until the latest possible mo-
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ment. Thus, a request for memory, which a process makes by means of the system calls
mmap and brk, does not retrieve allocated page frames. The process just gets the right to
access an expanded address space.
Virtual Memory Areas
The process’s virtual address space is described by Virtual Memory Area (VMA) descrip-
tors. Each of them defines a linear address interval. This is denoted by the fields vm_start,
which gives the start address, and vm_end, which holds the first address after the linear
interval. Besides from this, it can contain several access right flags. These essentially are
VM_READ, VM_WRITE, VM_EXEC, and VM_SHARED. The latter is used to indicate that the
corresponding pages may be shared with other processes.
In order to provide fast access to a single VMA descriptor if a particular address is given,
and on the other hand, allow efficient scans through the whole address space, each of
the descriptors is included into two data structures. The first type of access is satisfied by
using a red-black tree, which is some kind of balanced binary tree, while the second simply
requires a singly linked list. For further information, refer to pages 257-259 in [Lov05] and
358-362 in [BC06].
The root node of the red-black tree and the head of the singly linked list are accessible by
the fields mm_rb and mmap of the corresponding memory descriptor. In addition to these
fields, it contains all the information required for handling the process’s address space. It
especially holds start and end address of the heap which is a special VMA containing the
memory allocated by the malloc() C-library function.
Allocating Memory
As stated above, a process’s memory request does only effect its VMAs. Thus, a call
to brk, which is the system call for resizing the heap, does, for example, just enlarge the
corresponding VMA. The page tables remain unchanged at this time.
An allocation of page frames is deferred to the time when the process references a newly
assigned address. At this time the processor raises a page fault exception, and the Page
Fault Exception Handler allocates new page frames and creates the accordant mappings
by modifying the page tables (see section 2.1.4).
Another way to extend the process’s address space is calling mmap. This system call could
either be used to map files into the process’s address space—they are called file-backed
mappings—or could be used to allocate large blocks of blank memory, thus referred to as
anonymous mappings.
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Releasing Memory or Changing Access Rights
Regarding the brk system call again, the heap’s size can also be shrunken. In this case, it is
not sufficient to resize the VMA, but, in addition, it is required to modify the corresponding
page table entries. The same applies if a VMA’s access rights are changed. A process can
realize this for a particular address range by invoking the mprotect system call.
Flushing TLBs
Moreover, releasing memory and changing access rights claim that the processor’s TLBs
are flushed. In order to maintain a maximum in performance, the generic Linux kernel
provides a set of seven functions for TLB flushing, each one suitable for a particular sit-
uation. However, there are only three of them supported by the i386 architecture. These
are __flush_tlb(), __flush_tlb_global(), and __flush_tlb_single(addr). Further information about
this is provided on page 75 in [BC06].
2.1.4 The Page Fault Exception Handler
While normally being only recognized in conjunction with page faults caused by swapped-
out pages, the Page Fault Exception Handler is the heart of Linux’s memory management.
Therefore, it is responsible for concepts like copy-on-write and demand paging, which en-
able Linux to defer user requests for page frames until the latest possible moment. More-
over, it is the place where hardware-independent access rights get transformed and page
table entries are filled.
The page fault exception is raised each time the processor encounters a page table entry
without a set PRESENT flag or in case of an access which violates against the given rights.
In order to insert access rights into page table entries, the Page Fault Exception Handler
has to retrieve them from the data structures which were described in the previous sections.
The following paragraphs discuss how this is actually done for kernel and user domain
requests.
Retrieving Access Rights for Kernel Domain
Section ’Master Kernel Page Tables’ in 2.1.2 already pointed out that kernel mode accesses
to the first 896MB of physical memory never give raise to page fault exceptions. Further-
more, the kernel is generally granted read, write and execute access. If an exception is
raised in kernel mode, this normally occurs due to a newly installed non-linear mapping.
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In this case, the page fault handler links the corresponding master kernel page table to the
page tables of the current process (for details see page 350 in [BC06]).
Otherwise, it is probable that the referenced address has been a wrong system call pa-
rameter, which requires executing some fix-up code. As the origin of this particular fault
belongs to user space, it is typically handled the same way as those protection violations
described in the subsequent section.
Retrieving Access Rights for User Domain
If the Page Fault Exception Handler has been entered due to a user access, it firstly deter-
mines whether the accessed address belongs to a VMA of the current process. Secondly, it
validates that the access matches the access rights of this VMA. If one of these conditions
is not fulfilled the signal SIGSEGV is sent to the current process. If otherwise both are met,
a page frame is assigned to the process and the accordant mapping and access rights are
written to the page table. The following paragraphs show how access rights are actually
determined.
The first step consists of determining the current process. In order to understand the
following procedure, we have to be aware that each process has its own kernel mode stack,
and that this is used by the Page Fault Exception Handler, which runs on behalf of the cur-
rent process. Retrieving the stack pointer is easy. It just requires reading the esp register.
Now, Linux provides a fast method for returning the pointer to the process’s thread_info
structure. It just stores both kernel mode stack and thread_info structure in the same two
pages. As these are aligned to a 8KB boundary, the pointer to the thread_info structure is
obtained by masking the 13 least significant bits out: esp & 0xFFFFE000
0x015fa000
thread_info
structure
kernel mode stack
esp
0x015fa034
0x015fb000
task process
descriptor
Figure 2.1: combined kernel mode stack and thread_info structure
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Figure 2.1, which reproduces figure 3-2 on page 85 in [BC06], gives an example for a
combined kernel mode stack and thread_info structure. As it depicts, the field task points
to the process descriptor, which in turn holds field mm providing access to the memory
descriptor of the process.
Having received the memory descriptor, it is possible to find the corresponding VMA for
the address being accessed by the process. This is done by means of the read-black tree
(see ’Virtual Memory Areas’ below 2.1.3).
Now, we are able to determine the access rights which are stored in the VMA descriptor.
These essentially are VM_READ, VM_WRITE, VM_EXEC, and VM_SHARED. They have to
be transformed into hardware-dependent page protection bits which the MMU of the
processor can exercise. In case of the i386, these are only READ, WRITE, and PRESENT,
where the latter denotes a page in memory. As this requires downscaling, the appropriate
mappings are stored in the protection_map array. They are discussed in detail in [BC06] on
page 362 and the following.
2.2 uClinux for the Blackfin
uClinux is an operating system which has been derived from Linux in order to support
processors which lack a MMU. As this is often the case in embedded systems, this port of
Linux obtained the prefix ’uC’, which stands for µController.
Removing MMU support primarily affects the concepts of Virtual Memory and Memory
Protection, which had to be discarded, but does also concern issues like process creation
and handling heap and stack. However, with respect to the whole Linux kernel the modifi-
cations keep to a certain extend. Thus, uClinux is not a separate development tree, but has
been, since version 2.6, included into the generic Linux kernel.
Regarding Linux’s source code, substantial changes involve only the directory mm/ (mem-
ory management), where, in case of building uClinux, the file nommu.c is compiled while
a couple of original Linux files are omitted.
Further information about uClinux, its prospects, and its limitations can be found in
the Blackfin Linux Docs [BLD]. Especially, page ’operating_systems’ provides a
short introduction to uClinux, while memory management is described on pages ’ker-
nel_space_memory_allocation’ and ’user_space_memory_allocation’. This documenta-
tion is part of the uClinux distribution for the Blackfin processor, which provides, besides
the actual kernel, additional libraries, drivers and Makefiles for building the uClinux sys-
tem.
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This diploma thesis employs release 2006R2-RC2 of the uClinux distribution. Infor-
mation about the configuration and build process can be obtained from page ’compil-
ing_the_kernel’ in [BLD].
2.2.1 Data Structures
Detaching Linux’s MMU-related concepts obviously has deep impact on memory man-
agement. However, in order to retain a memory subsystem that fits into the rest of the
kernel seamlessly, most of the data structures essentially remained unchanged. In spite of
this, the following data structures incurred significant modifications.
Page Tables
As page tables act as interface between processor and operating system and as they are
referred to in a few places, they have been removed. This is, e.g., visible when invoking: 
root:~> cat /proc/meminfo
MemTotal: 54456 kB
MemFree: 50140 kB
Slab: 3452 kB
CommitLimit: 27228 kB
Committed_AS: 0 kB
PageTables: 0 kB
VmallocTotal: 0 kB
VmallocUsed: 0 kB
VmallocChunk: 0 kB 
In general, the former paging mechanism reduces to subdividing memory into pages which
serve as minimum allocation units. They retained a size of 4KB.
VMAs
The actual VMA descriptors are the same as in Linux, but there have been introduced
substantial changes for the data structures they are contained in. While Linux organizes
VMAs in a red-black tree and a singly linked list, uClinux only provides a singly linked
list for each memory descriptor. Moreover, this list does not consist of directly chained
VMA descriptors, but is made up of elements of type struct vm_list_struct. Each of those
elements contains a pointer to one VMA descriptor.
In addition, there is one system-wide red-black tree, which involves the VMAs of all pro-
cesses. Whereas we referred to Linux’s VMAs by the memory descriptor’s fields mmap
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and mm_rb, uClinux provides the field context.vmlist as head of the singly linked list and the
global structure nommu_vma_tree for the red-black tree.
Heap
Due to the lack of Virtual Memory uClinux does not implement the system call brk. Thus,
the simplest implementation of the C-library function malloc() does just use the mmap sys-
tem call to create anonymous mappings. Even if there is a second implementation config-
urable, this is the default setting.
2.2.2 Memory Regions
On top of the general modifications of uClinux, there are some special adjustments in or-
der to support the Blackfin processor. It is described in [PR06]. The entire information
about its memory protection scheme is given in section ’Memory Protection and Proper-
ties’, which is part of chapter 6 ’Memory’. Information about its interrupts and exceptions
is stated in the three sections ’Events and Interrupts’, ’Interrupt Processing’, and ’Hard-
ware Errors and Exception Handling’ under chapter 4 ’Program Sequencer’. One of the
modifications of uClinux is the introduction of memory regions.
Besides the PDT as it is described in section 2.1.2, uClinux manages two additional data
structures which sometimes are also referred to as PDTs. These two tables are necessary
if uClinux defines more ICPLB or DCPLB entries than the Blackfin’s CPLBs can hold.
Using the term PDT in this context probably goes back to the Blackfin Processor Program-
ming Reference [PR06], where more details can be found on page 6-50.
In the present case the term Descriptor refers to the properties size, cachability, and access
rights, while Page describes a memory area which is to be covered by a CPLB. In order
to make IPDT and DPDT configurable, they are generated at initialization of the kernel.
This is done according to the constant data structure cplb_data, which defines a couple of
memory regions in linux-2.6.x/include/asm-blackfin/cplbinit.h.
2.2.3 Memory Protection
Besides the main issue of providing selectable cachability for distinct memory areas, the
Blackfin-port of uClinux implements some approaches towards memory protection.
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Zero-Pointer Accesses
Most of the uninitialized pointers contain address values being equal to zero. In order to
prevent those zero-pointers from referencing kernel code, the first page in memory is left
blank. Neither the kernel nor any user application occupies this space in Random Access
Memory (RAM). Thus a pointer which references data structures smaller than 4KB is not
able to reach into the kernel code which starts at 0x1000.
Tracking Zero-Pointer Accesses
While the previous approach keeps zero-pointer accesses from corrupting kernel code, it is
still a problem that those access remain undetected. Therefore, the uClinux distribution for
the Blackfin offers the configuration option DEBUG_HUNT_FOR_ZERO, which implements
an additional ICPLB and DCPLB entry covering the first 4KB of memory. Since this page
is also covered by a large 4MB ICPLB and DCPLB entry, now, each access to this spare
memory triggers the Multiple CPLB Hits exception.
Misaligned Accesses
Protection against misaligned accesses is more related to the Blackfin’s capabilities than to
uClinux. It denotes the ability of the Blackfin processor to verify proper alignment of each
memory access. According to its load-store architecture, memory accesses only occur in
conjunction with load or store instructions. As these act on whole (32-bit) or half registers
(16-bit), addresses have to be multiples of 4 or 2, respectively.
If a faulting instruction occurs, it is skipped, and the processor throws an exception.
uClinux uses this exception to display some debug and hardware-trace information. Addi-
tionally, the misbehaving application receives the SIGBUS signal.
Conclusion
Reading the section ’Introduction to uClinux’ on page ’operating_systems’ in [BLD] sug-
gests that there is some kind of kernel-code protection. In fact, this is not given. The
measures taken in uClinux solely reduce the likeliness for uninitialized pointers to harm
kernel code or data.
As these pointers often reference unaligned addresses or point to addresses near zero, the
three described approaches offer some protection against bugs in user space, but obviously,
gain no security against malicious accesses.
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Now, having discussed relevant aspects of Linux and uCinux, along with the underlying
hardware platform of the Blackfin processor, we are able to figure out the principle design
choices of memory protection for uClinux.
3.1 Memory Protection for uClinux
As stated in section 2.2, uClinux has been directly derived from Linux by removing the
mechanism of Virtual Memory and Memory Protection. Thus, apparently, memory protec-
tion can be made available to uClinux by porting the according parts of Linux to uClinux.
But, as indicated by figure 3.1 the general data structures and functions for providing mem-
ory protection, like e.g. VMAs, have never been removed from uClinux, even though they
have been simplified.
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Figure 3.1: uClinux’s ancestry
So, what is actually missing? It is the interface between the processor and these hardware
independent data structures. In Linux this link is set up by means of page tables and the
page fault exception handler. But, as these are highly involved in Virtual Memory and
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the underlying processor architecture, describing the required action as porting them to
uClinux would be inadequate.
Thus, the main aspect of this chapter is designing a new interface to provide the Blackfin
with access to the existent data structures. Nevertheless Linux’s page tables and the page
fault exception handler can serve as a starting point.
3.1.1 Discarding Page Tables
As reimplementing page tables might be considered an easy way to provide the interface
described in the previous section, they are discussed at first. Thinking about the usage of
page tables requires looking at Linux in conjunction with the i386 architecture. Processors
of this family are able to traverse page tables and fill their TLBs in hardware. A software
routine, namely the page fault exception handler, is only needed upon an empty page table
entry (PRESENT bit cleared – page not in memory).
The Blackfin does not have the ability to use page tables in hardware. Its Cacheability Pro-
tection Lookaside Buffers are similar to software-managed Translation Lookaside Buffers,
which throw a TLB miss exception in case they encounter an address that is not covered
by a TLB entry. According to TLB miss, the Blackfin features a similar exception which
is called Cacheability Protection Lookaside Buffer (CPLB) Miss. As the CPLB Miss han-
dler is part of the substitute to the page fault exception handler, it is dealt with in the next
section.
At first, we need to find out whether the associated handler has to use page tables, even
if they are not supported by the Blackfin processor. As we already pointed out in section
2.1.2, page tables serve as a helper data structure for processors which manage their TLBs
in hardware. Regarding memory protection, they are not a common data structure which
Linux relies on. However, Linux depends on page tables to manage additional virtual
memory related concepts, like swapping pages to disk and deferring allocation of page
frames (demand paging). But as these are not applicable to the Blackfin, the CPLB Miss
handler is able to skip the step of page tables and insert access rights, which it retrieves
from Linux’s hardware independent data structures, directly into CPLBs. To sum up: page
tables are not required for implementing memory protection in uClinux for the Blackfin
processor.
Of course, it has to be considered that CPLB Miss may become the most frequent excep-
tion in the system, and hence, using unoptimized data structures will cause considerably
longer execution times. Thus it is up to the designer to determine whether page tables
should serve as a kind of cache for the exception handler. In the end it is a decision of trad-
ing system performance for increased memory consumption. As memory in embedded
systems is scarce and this diploma thesis tries to set up a basic approach, leaving extensive
optimizations to future work, page tables are omitted, for now.
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It might be considered for continuative attempts that Linux’s page table management, in-
cluding special cases of direct modification from outside the page fault handler, has been
completely removed from uClinux. Thus, a cache could rely on an alternative data struc-
ture as well, hence providing better memory exploitation.
3.1.2 Replacing the Page Fault Exception Handler
After page tables turned out not to be helpful, the interface between the Blackfin and
the access right containing data structures became solely a matter of a handler similar to
Linux’s page fault exception handler. As already stated in the last section, its counterpart
for the Blackfin consists at least of the CPLB Miss exception handler and is completed
by the CPLB Protection Violation and Multiple CPLB Hits exception handlers. As far as
memory protection is concerned, these three handlers present to uClinux, what the page
fault exception handler does to Linux. Their implementation is the main focus of this
thesis.
Referring to the distinction between Instruction CPLBs (ICPLBs) and Data CPLBs (DC-
PLBs) (see 2.3.4), there are even twice as much handlers. But since handling of ICPLBs
and DCPLBs is nearly identical, it is sufficient to describe three basic handlers, which have
to be slightly modified because reads from and writes to the appropriate registers require
a different address offset. Doing this dynamically, costs little performance and prevents
from doubled source code and increased code memory footprint.
Now, before having a brief look at each handlers function, it has to be clarified why three
handlers are required in the case of uClinux, while one is sufficient in Linux.
Leaving the actual implementation of the three handlers out of regard, the page fault ex-
ception, because it is raised upon an miss-set PRESENT, READ or WRITE flag, is most
closely related to the CPLB Protection Violation exception. As already described, CPLB
Miss corresponds to TLB handling. Due to the fact that kernel and user space share the
same address space, also Multiple CPLB Hits has to be included in this functional union.
As this might not be evident at the first glance, some more details are given in the following
section.
3.1.3 Concept of Kernel Preference
Linux does not declare several page frames to be part of the kernel space. From the kernels
point of view every page frame belongs to kernel space. Thus, all page frames which are
linearly mapped into the first 896MB of kernels address space (above 3GB) are treated
equally and are combined into huge pages. For the i386 architecture they have a size of
4MB. By this measure, the kernel gains some performance improvement because one level
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of page tables can be omitted and memory which would otherwise be used for page tables
can be saved. Anyway, the main thing is that just one single TLB can cover a large amount
of memory. As these huge pages are pre-installed into the page tables of each process (see
2.1.3) kernel accesses to this memory region never give raise to exceptions, thus making
execution timing more predictable.
Regarding these kernel optimizations, the most serious drawback in uClinux is the flat
address space which limits the kernel to use the same address space as user processes.
Under these circumstances, implementing large kernel CPLB entries leads unavoidably
to overlapping CPLB entries if the kernel and a user process are both accessing memory
inside the same 4MB-sized and 4MB-aligned region.
To overcome this problem, either page-sized kernel CPLB entries (4KB) have to be used
or the overlapping entries have to be tracked and handled by the Multiple CPLB Hits
exception. Regarding exception frequency and CPLB utilization, choosing the second
approach leads by far to better results.
In particular, this means that a huge kernel CPLB entry is inserted every time the kernel
accesses an uncovered memory address even if it overlaps some user entries.
3.1.4 Overview of CPLB Exception Handlers
In short, the three handlers mesh together as follows. The CPLB Miss handler is called
every time a memory access is not covered by a valid CPLB entry. It is responsible for
setting up an appropriate entry for both user and kernel mode. An exception from kernel
mode can be handled easily because its access rights are fixed. For user mode, it is required
to determine the according access rights from VMAs. If no matching VMA can be found,
the handler sends a SIGSEGV signal. Inserting new CPLB entries is done only here.
The CPLB Protection Violation handler is responsible for handling accesses that violate
against installed CPLBs. In case of a real protection violation, which means a process
violates against access rights given by its VMAs, the SIGSEGV signal is sent. But for the
most part, processes legally access addresses being covered by a kernel CPLB entry. This
case is handled by simply removing the according entry.
As already described in the previous section, the Multiple CPLB Hits handler has to re-
move overlapping CPLB entries. If the access is made by user mode, the user entry is
kept while the kernel entry is discarded. For the kernel the same applies the other way
around.
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3.1.5 Prospects and Limitations
Of course, this overview was a bit vague. But before discussing the CPLB exception han-
dlers in detail, we should disclose which prospects are rendered possible by this extension
to uClinux. On the other hand, we should not overestimate introduction of memory pro-
tection and be aware of its limitations.
Even though uClinux will still suffer from the constraints of a VM-less system, essential
steps towards security have been made. By just substituting Linux’s page fault exception
handler, protection of processes against other processes renders possible. As a matter of
course this also includes protection of the kernel.
Solely reducing memory protection to the distinction between kernel and user space is not
as easy as it might seem. We will discuss advantages and disadvantages of this approach
in section 3.3.
Another prospect, even if it is related to future work, is the introduction of the mprotect
system call, which is not accessible in uClinux at the moment. Implementing user-user
protection provides the basis for porting this system call and hence benefiting from en-
hanced debugging features.
However, there are some drawbacks, too. If the executable format FLAT is used, which
is quite advisable because it is fitted to systems where memory is a scarce property, one
single VMA contains code, data, and stack regions. Thus, executable and data memory are
enfolded. Moreover, these regions may even be combined into the same pages. This com-
pletely renders any attempt of separation impossible. Additional VMAs are only created
upon allocation of new memory areas. One example for this to happen is the usage of the
malloc function.
In this respect, a change for the better can be achieved only by using the FDPIC ELF. As its
name suggests, it is based upon Linux’s ELF format and hence, contains some dispensable
data, making these files larger in size. However, these binaries are loaded into distinct
memory areas having their own VMAs. Even if this separation does partly wast pages,
it might be valuable if, besides protection against other processes, also process internal
memory protection has to be aimed.
After we discovered the close relationship between the three CPLB exception handlers
and the Page Fault Exception Handler in section 3.1.2, now, some further thoughts should
prevent from overestimation. For example, if one looks at dynamic growth of user stacks
in Linux, he might consider using the newly introduced memory protection to implement
this feature in uClinux, as well.
Of course, detecting out-of-bound accesses, which indicate a stack overflow, is no problem.
To do this, we just have to insert a VMA covering the page below the stack and clear all its
user access rights. Now, the according exception could be used to enlarge the stack. But,
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what if there is no space for further expansions at this particular memory location? In this
case the whole stack would have to be moved. But, due to the missing Virtual Memory,
there is no way to redirect each pointer referring to this stack.
Similarly, all attempts to port Virtual Memory related concepts, like demand paging, copy
on write or even fork, will fail at this point. The capability of the Blackfin to raise excep-
tions upon predefined memory accesses can not be used in the way it is done with the Page
Fault Exception Handler. It is bound to Memory Protection only.
One of the most severe drawbacks is the performance issue. The time consumed by the
CPLB exception handlers affects the overall processor throughput and furthermore, as
exception handlers are non-interruptible, the interrupt latency. Both of which are analyzed
in chapter 5. The topic of reducing interrupt latency is especially dealt in section 3.4.
3.2 CPLB Exception Handlers
While the overview in section 3.1.4 was very brief, the following description of the three
CPLB exception handlers CPLB Miss, CPLB Protection Violation, and Multiple CPLB
Hits will reveal conceptual details. Furthermore, their actual implementations are pre-
sented in sections 4.1 and 4.2.
3.2.1 CPLB Miss
Although described in section 3.1.2 as counterpart to TLB miss, only, the CPLBMiss han-
dler is the main part of the processor’s interface to access-right containing data structures.
Due to the lack of page tables, the CPLB Miss handler is also responsible for retrieving
access rights.
This procedure splits up into two paths. As visible in figure 3.2, they correspond to ac-
cesses from kernel (right path) or user domain (middle path). Each of them prepares a
CPLB entry according to the needs of the particular domain.
Access from Kernel Domain
Since the kernel has always preference (compare section 3.1.3), processing this path is fast
and easy. Both size and access rights are set to fixed values. A new CPLB entry always
provides full supervisor access to a region of 4MB of memory. The term ’read & write or
execute’, as introduced by the second of the two boxes in figure 3.2, refers to the handlers
usage for DCPLBs and ICPLBs, respectively.
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Figure 3.2: flow chart – CPLB Miss exception handler
In addition to size, which, by the way, might be reduced in conjunction with setting the
caching strategy, and access rights, this path sets a flag to constitute the prepared entry as
part of the kernel. In section 3.2.2 we will discover the reason why it is not sufficient to
mark kernel CPLB entries by just omitting user access rights.
Access from User Domain
Handling a CPLB Miss for an access made by a process requires more effort. Firstly,
we have to localize the corresponding VMA. The sequence for this to be done is similar
to the one described for the Page Fault Exception Handler in section 2.1.4. It consists of
determining the current process, thereafter, referencing the process and memory descriptor,
and finally, searching through a list of VMAs. As uClinux does not manage its VMAs in a
tree (see section 2.2.1), the last step is a bit different to the one in Linux.
Michael Ulbricht 21
3 Design
Provided that a matching VMA has been found, we have to determine the start address and
the size of the new CPLB entry. This pair of steps requires the following. The resulting
CPLB has to cover the faulting address and fit into the address range of the according
VMA. Additionally, it has to be aligned to its own size, which in turn has to be equal to
the largest possible value out of 4KB, 1MB, or 4MB.
As a third step, we have to set the access rights according to the vm_flags field of the VMA.
Since each of the flags VM_READ, VM_WRITE, and VM_EXEC is directly supported
by the Blackfin processor (see section 2.1.4 for comparison to the i386 architecture), no
transformation is needed.
If the faulting address did not belong to a VMA of the current process, the SIGSEGV
signal informs the process about its lapse (left path).
Caching Strategy
As disabling the cache of the Blackfin would, even in a basic approach, not be applicable
and enabling requires distinguishing different types of memory regions, an additional step
has to be introduced before newly created CPLB entries can finally be inserted.
While the ordinary kernel memory benefits by data or instruction caches, regions which
map hardware registers or are affected by Direct Memory Access (DMA) explicitly forbid
the usage of caches. Others, e.g. the portion of RAM which serves as disk, may decrease
system performance if data accesses were made through the SRAM cache. Thus, uClinux
implements a data structure which lists all memory regions and specifies their require-
ments. More information about this can be found in sections 2.2.2 and 4.1.3.
By using uClinux’s memory regions, it is possible to easily insert the appropriate caching
strategy into the new CPLB entry. At the moment, caching strategy indicates only whether
the cache is enabled, which is done in write through mode for ease, or disabled.
On the other hand, this means that kernel CPLB entries will be reduced in size if they span
across different memory regions. However, as uClinux requires start and end addresses of
its memory regions to be 1MB-aligned, shrinking is limited to a minimum size of 1MB.
User CPLB entries are, as far as the current configuration is concerned, bound to single
regions and thus not affected.
Insert new CPLB Entry
While we could achieve slight performance improvements by reducing the execution time
of the previous steps, e.g. by introducing some kind of cache for retrieving size and ac-
cess right information or a dedicated data structure for determining the caching strategy,
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this step is highly important for system efficiency. Implementing a clever algorithm for
inserting CPLB entries can avoid handling of unnecessary CPLB Misses.
empty CPLB?
victimize
CPLB in use
   no
 yes
insert new
CPLB entry
write new entry
to selected CPLB
find empty CPLB
Figure 3.3: flow chart – insert new CPLB entry
When trying to find such an algorithm, it quickly becomes clear that the tricky part consists
of deciding which CPLB entry to substitute. Thus, at first, every free CPLB should be
exploited (see figure 3.3). For a first approach, it is sufficient to search linearly through
all CPLBs, while a buffer, e.g. a stack, managing the free CPLBs should be considered
later.
However, the actual creative part remains to victimizing a CPLB in use. But as for a basic
version function is more important than performance, this first implementation consists
of a simple round robin scheme. Due to the lack of time, advanced concepts have to be
deferred to future work.
3.2.2 CPLB Protection Violation
As already stated in section 3.1.4, the CPLB Protection Violation handler is executed if a
memory access violates against an installed CPLB. This could either refer to a bug in user
or kernel space or, as it is most often the case, be caused by a kernel CPLB entry covering
the current process’s address space.
The latter is related to the concept of kernel preference, which we discussed in sec-
tion 3.1.3. There, this concept was illustrated by overlapping kernel and user CPLBs,
which happens if a present user CPLB entry gets covered by a kernel entry. Even if the
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CPLB Protection Violation handler deals with the reversed case – a present kernel entry
keeps from installing a user entry – the solution is still the same. If the access was made
from user space, the kernel CPLB entry has to be removed. In figure 3.4 this case is
denoted by the middle path.
remove kernel
CPLB entry
send signal
to process
   no
   no
bug in kernel
(kernel oops)
 yes
yes 
Exception Handler for
CPLB Protection Violation
fixed
CPLB entry?
user
CPLB entry?
yes 
   no
find affected
CPLB entry
remove corrupt
CPLB entry
from kernel
domain?
Figure 3.4: flow chart – CPLB Protection Violation exception handler
Bug in Kernel Space
If we ended up in the right path, we would find ourselves in a serious error condition which
requires a corrupt CPLB entry to be caused. Entering the CPLB Protection Violation
handler from kernel mode is not otherwise possible because, until now, uClinux defines
no read-only memory regions, and thus both user and kernel CPLB entries grant overall
access to the kernel. If read-only memory regions were introduced some day, this path
would have to handle erroneous kernel write accesses, too.
In such a situation we have to remove the corrupt CPLB entry to avoid further interference.
But, as this error condition is the result of a kernel bug, it also seems reasonable to call
the kernel function die(), which writes the contents of all processor registers on the console
(kernel oops) and kills the current process. Finally we should try to resume.
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Access from User Space
Handling accesses from user space is less critical. As it depends on the affected CPLB
entry, finding this CPLB is the first step. For details see section 4.2.1. If it turns out
that the exception has been risen due to a violation against the access rights of the current
process, we send the signal SIGSEGV (left path). Otherwise, the middle path, as described
above, is applied. Which path we have to choose depends on whether the affected CPLB
entry belongs to kernel or user space and whether it is a fixed entry or not.
User or Kernel CPLB Entry
If the according CPLB entry belongs to the current process itself, a proper protection
violation is obvious. This has not to be further approved because installed user CPLB
entries always reflect up-to-date access rights of the current process. Each time CPLBs
may get invalid, the kernel flushes them (see section 3.2.4). Hence, there is no need for
checking the according VMA. Actually, the processor has already done this by executing
the CPLB Miss handler and comparing each access to the generated CPLB.
Just distinguishing user and kernel CPLBs is left to the CPLB Protection Violation handler.
At first glance we might regard a kernel CPLB as one that grants read and write to the
supervisor and no access rights to the user.
But on closer inspection, we notice that this kind of entry is also required if a process
tries to read from an execute-only memory area. In this case the inserted DCPLB lacks all
user access rights and has to lead to a SIGSEGV signal. If the CPLB Protection Violation
handler recognized it as kernel CPLB entry, it would just be removed and the process
would hang because this in turn leads to inserting the same DCPLB entry as before.
In consequence user-kernel distinction is made by means of the CPLB_LOCK bit, which
is set in every kernel CPLB entry.
Fixed CPLB Entries
Those violations we discussed in the previous section are strictly bound to memory ranges
which are covered by the process’s VMAs. User accesses which do not address this space
are normally handled by CPLB Miss. However, there is one exception: if the access
references an address which is covered by a fixed CPLB, it is handled here. In this case the
according fixed kernel CPLB entry must never be removed, and as these memory regions
do not overlap with a process’s address space, a user access can definitely be considered a
bug.
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Fixed CPLBs are required because code and data of the CPLB exception handlers must al-
ways be covered by a CPLB. Section 3.2.4 gives further details about how this requirement
is met.
As the number of fixed CPLBs is constant, we are able to identify fixed entries by position.
Thus, the CPLB_LOCK bit, which was originally intended for marking non-removable
entries, can be used otherwise as described above.
If none of the two user-bug cases apply, the kernel CPLB entry is removed. Thereafter, a
CPLBMiss exception will occur and the CPLBMiss handler will insert the new user CPLB
entry. For performance reasons, we could also call this handler directly after removing the
kernel CPLB entry. For more information about the resulting effects on interrupt latency,
see section 3.4.3.
3.2.3 Multiple CPLB Hits
The Multiple CPLB Hits exception handler is called each time the Blackfin detects an
access to an address covered by more than one CPLB. As long as accesses do not re-
fer to overlapping regions of the larger CPLB, this one can be used as if no interference
would exist. As the necessity to handle overlapping CPLBs has already been described in
sections 3.1.3 and 3.2.2, these remarks are kept rather short.
Since in uClinux an overlap always consists of a large kernel CPLB and smaller user
CPLBs, kernel-kernel and user-user combinations of overlapping CPLBs are considered
a kernel bug (see figure 3.5), and hence are treated the same way as discussed in ’Bug in
Kernel Space’ under section 3.2.2.
Under normal conditions, when an access has hit a kernel and a user CPLB, this one
is removed which does not belong to the domain the access was made from. Broken
down to particular cases, an access from user domain requires removing the kernel CPLB
entry, whereas an access from kernel domain requires removing the user CPLB entry. See
table 3.1.
accessing domain 1st aff. CPLB 2nd aff. CPLB action likelihood
user kernel user remove 1st most
user kernel remove 2nd
kernel kernel user remove 2nd less
user kernel remove 1st
user or kernel kernel kernel remove both unexpected
user user
Table 3.1: removing CPLB entries
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   no
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Figure 3.5: flow chart – Multiple CPLB Hits exception handler
It is obvious that we must remove the kernel entry if the access has been made from user
domain. But if it has been from kernel domain, removing the user entry is not the only
possibility. In theory, we could also eliminate the kernel entry because user entries grant
access to the kernel, too. But, as the implementation of an early attempt has revealed,
always removing the kernel entry leads to a system crash. The brief reason is as fol-
lows: Blackfin’s parallel instructions are able to access two memory locations, which
might require removing and installing a kernel CPLB entry at the same time. In par-
ticular, the instruction which caused this in the case of the early attempt is situated in
linux-2.6.x/arch/blackfin/lib/memcpy.S at line 89.
However, even if Multiple CPLB Hits for kernel accesses are less likely, since the kernel
does not normally access user space, their quantity is still considerable. Hence, according
to the concept of kernel preference, removing the user entry is the better choice, anyway.
3.2.4 Associated Requirements
Covering Exception Handlers’ Memory
In order to be accessible to the Blackfin, memory regions have to be covered by CPLBs;
code and data of exception handlers are not an exception. If the memory of the CPLB
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Miss handler was not covered, a CPLB Miss exception would lead to an infinite loop of
exception calls. The same applies to the Multiple CPLB Hits handler. If its memory was
covered by more than one CPLB, the system would crash.
There are two realizations imaginable. Either two small 4KB entries are used to cover the
according memory by one ICPLB and one DCPLB or this is done by larger 1MB entries.
The first case suffers from a significant drawback. The surrounding 1MB-region must not
be covered by 1MB-CPLB entries because this would cause an overlap. Hence, other user
or kernel accesses to this region have to be made with the help of inefficient 4KB entries.
Thus, using two 1MB-entries is the better choice. Besides preventing the use of 4MB-
entries for the accordant 4MB-region, this approach only requires us to guarantee that
the 1MB-regions which include the exception handlers’ memory are not assigned to user
space. The kernel is able to use this memory without inserting an additional CPLB.
1MB
Kernel Init / Managed Pages
Kernel Managed Pages
Dynamic Memory
Static Memory
Not managed by Kernel
Exception Handler’s
Memory
uninitialized
initialized
Kernel Data
Kernel Code
Zero-Pointer Gap
kernel load
address
0x00000
Figure 3.6: memory layout
The easiest way to keep user pages out of this region is locating the CPLB exception
handlers’ memory inside the first 1MB of RAM. If the kernel code is configured to be
at least 1MB in size, this position is ideal. In this case, the code of the CPLB exception
handlers, which is found near the beginning of kernel code, is already located at the correct
place. See figure 3.6.
Since the portions of stack and data can not reside in the region of kernel data, we have
to relocate them to the memory beneath kernel code, which was previously used as zero-
pointer gap. This spare memory is not longer required because memory protection does
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already catch zero-pointer accesses. Thus, it can be used to easily move data before kernel
code. In section 4.3.1, we will look at the way how this is actually done.
However, if the init region starts inside the first 1MB, additional measures have to be
introduced. Maybe, kernel init, which is freed after kernel initialization phase, could be
relocated above kernel data. Alternatively, we could also think about generally moving
CPLB exception handlers’ memory to the SRAM.
Flushing CPLBs
As described in section 2.1.3, the generic Linux kernel provides a set of functions for TLB
flushing. Whenever mappings of pages to page frames or process’s access rights change,
one of these functions is called. Since the native uClinux does not map pages and ignores
access rights, TLB flushing has been completely removed.
While implementing the chief mechanisms of memory protection confined to substituting
CPLB exception handlers, flushing CPLBs is more intrusive. It consists of two steps.
Firstly, defining a set of CPLB flushing functions, and secondly, inserting function calls
where access rights are changed and hence CPLBs are invalidated.
The first task turns out to be the easier one. While the generic Linux kernel implements
seven functions for specific page table modifications, in uClinux only user CPLBs depend-
ing on VMAs of the current process have to be tracked, whereas kernel CPLB entries never
get invalid. Thus, step one reduces to implementing two functions. See table 3.2.
__flush_cplb() mapped by flush_tlb()
task removing all user CPLB entries
typ. usage performing a process switch
__flush_cplb_range() mapped by flush_tlb_range()
task removing user CPLB entries intersected
by a given address range
typ. usage releasing VMAs
Table 3.2: functions for CPLB flushing
The second task, calling these functions, requires some more effort because we have to
consider every code location where access rights are changed. But as this is strictly bound
to VMAs and as uClinux treats them in a special way, they are handled mainly in one
source file (mm/nommu.c). There, functions which remove VMAs or modify their sizes
have to be provided with a call to flush_tlb_range(), which is part of the generic kernel
interface.
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However, the more frequent situation that requires CPLB flushing is the process switch.
As it invalidates all previous user CPLB entries, flush_tlb() has to be applied in this case.
The actual code modifications, including adaptations of the kernel interface mappings, are
given in section 4.3.2.
3.3 Protection Variants
This section deals with the first question mentioned in the conceptual formulation of the
thesis: ‘Shall individual applications be isolated from each other or is it sufficient to isolate
the kernel domain from the applications?’
At first, it should be remarked that this thesis is not able to determine whether a protection
of the kernel against user processes, herein after referred to as kernel-user protection, is
sufficient or not. This decision relates to the actual embedded application. Of course,
as far as security is concerned, protection of individual applications against each other,
referred to as user-user protection, is the better choice as it includes the kernel-user issue.
We will discuss in the following two sections if both variants are equally applicable and if
a kernel-user solution results in a significant performance enhancement.
3.3.1 user-user Protection
Until now, the entire chapter 3 described the user-user protection scheme. Introducing this
variant at first should not surprise because it is the way in which Linux protects memory.
But there is a second reason which refers to the architecture of the Blackfin.
The Blackfin’s MMU does not present a mechanism to forbid accesses, especially from
user space, but features CPLB entries, which explicitly permit accesses. In the first case the
focus would be on kernel pages which would have to be covered in order to be protected
against user accesses. Handling such hardware would be difficult since the kernel does
not manage special kernel pages (see section 3.1.3) and user space is organized process-
wise.
By providing CPLBs, which permit access, the Blackfin directs attention to the coverage
of the current process’s address space and hence privileges the user-user variant. Kernel
CPLB entries are only required to grant overall access to the kernel and set appropriate
caching strategies. As user CPLB entries do not overhang the VMAs of the current process,
they provide protection for both other process’s address space and kernel space.
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3.3.2 kernel-user Protection
Now, according to the initial statement declaring discussion about user-user and kernel-
user protection a matter of performance, we will figure out if relieving memory protection
of strict process separation, can avoid some overhead.
Especially the limited number of CPLBs is a bottle-neck of the protection mechanism. In
conjunction with the VMAs, which are typically smaller than 1MB and thus have to be
accessed through 4KB-CPLBs, process execution can get rather slow. Chapter 5 presents
definite measurements about this. If, due to the release of barriers in address space, VMAs
were merged into chunks of user memory spanning at least one aligned 1MB-region,
CPLBs could be used more efficiently and the number of victimizations would decrease.
Releasing user-user-specific boundaries, thus implementing a kernel-user approach, offers
three possibilities with regard to address space. Firstly, we are able to ignore barriers
between different types of VMAs belonging to the same process. As a result, the whole
process’s address space becomes readable, writeable, and executable.
Secondly, we can willfully neglect process barriers, hence treating all VMAs as part of one
general user space. By the way, uClinux does already provide a data structure joining up
all VMAs in a tree (see section 2.2.1).
Thirdly, in order to merge larger chunks, we should also count free pages among user
space. This requires to either find a way to use the structure of page descriptors or extend
the buddy allocator for an additional data structure since its lists are not suitable for finding
free regions by address.
Free Memory (in Buddy Lists)
Memory used by the Kernel
0x00000000
0x03400000
0x03000000
0x00400000
VMAs
Kernel Mode Stacks
wasted Memory (power-of-2 allocation)
Figure 3.7: uClinux’s typical memory distribution
As depicted in figure 3.7, which shows a snapshot of uClinux’s usual memory distribution,
chunks of user space and free memory are often disrupted by kernel pages. One reason is
that VMAs do not generally span the whole memory block they received from the buddy
allocator. Since this memory is not covered by a VMA, it appears as kernel memory.
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But most of the kernel pages actually contain kernel data. Thus, forming large chunks of
aligned 1MB-regions is hardly possible. There is just one particular case in figure 3.7: the
1MB-chunk in the address range from 0x03000000 to 0x03100000, which consists of two
separate VMAs.
Besides the barriers in address space, there is also a barrier between processes in time:
the process switch. Whereas user-user protection required flushing all user CPLBs before
switching to the next process, this is unnecessary for the kernel-user approach. However,
the resulting gain in performance, except for avoiding the flushing operation itself, will
be minimal. Because of the small number of CPLBs, the installed entries of a previous
process will be victimized shortly after the next process began to run. This situation would
change immediately if CPLBs were exploited by large 1MB-entries.
3.3.3 Resume
According to the above discussion, it appears that releasing the strength of user-user pro-
tection is only reasonable if user and kernel pages were separated by uClinux, at least
in situations when enough free memory is available. Besides this, the application of the
kernel-user approach is feasible if running processes require large amounts of memory.
3.4 Reducing Interrupt Latency
Until now, we have seen CPLB handlers as solid blocks being completely served in excep-
tion mode. However, this simple approach disregards the issue of interrupt latency. Excep-
tions have higher priority than interrupts; only nonmaskable interrupts and emulation and
reset events can interrupt them. For this reason, e.g. user processes accessing uncovered
memory regions do frequently prevent interrupts from being serviced immediately.
3.4.1 The Problem
At a closer look, CPLB exception handlers increase interrupt latency in three ways. Firstly,
if they are raised in user mode or due to an interrupt of low priority, they keep interrupts
of higher priority from being serviced. This major problem is depicted in figure 3.8.
Secondly, CPLB exception handlers can defer hardware acknowledgement even if the ac-
cording interrupt service routine (ISR) has started to be serviced. This happens if the ISR
itself gives rise to a CPLB exception, e.g. if the current kernel mode stack is not covered
by a valid DCPLB. See figure 3.9.
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IRQ
latency
user
interrupt
exception
... ...
...
Figure 3.8: direct blocking of an interrupt service routine
IRQ
latency
int 8
exception
...int 13
IRQ
ACK
latency
Figure 3.9: delaying of a hardware acknowledgement
Thirdly, as also induced by the second case, ISRs which retard themselves by raising CPLB
exceptions will in turn increase the latency of lower priority interrupts. Figures 3.8 and 3.9
show only these fractions of interrupt latencies which are related to CPLB exceptions.
3.4.2 The Approach
Since we claimed the monolithic constitution of the CPLB handlers to be responsible for
increased interrupt latency, this should be changed. Thus, each handler has to be subdi-
vided into parts . . .
Ê which are deferrable
Ë which can be at least programmed in assembler
Ì which we have to write in C
Parts which refer toÊ offer excellent potential for reducing interrupt latency. As indicated
by figure 3.10, we are able to defer them to an interrupt of low priority. But this is only
applicable to parts which handle exceptions form user space. All other parts may also
handle an exception which occurred in an ISR and are, thus, not deferrable to an interrupt
of lower priority than the ISR’s one.
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IRQ
latency
user
int 8
exception
... ...
...
int 15
Figure 3.10: deferred exception handling
Even if Linux commonly handles exceptions in C and only realizes the exception entry
in assembler, it is advisable to select frequently used paths which induce limited imple-
mentation effort for category Ë. Although the resulting code is not easily portable, this
avoids saving all processor registers to the stack. All remaining parts, which have to be
programmed in C, belong to Ì.
3.4.3 Analysing the CPLB Exception Handlers
CPLB Miss
As the largest part of the CPLB Miss handler is responsible for dealing with accesses
from user mode, it is obvious that deferring this part constitutes a major step in reducing
interrupt latency. Additionally, realizing the entry in assembler reduces the time spent in
exception mode. While this is quite easy for a simple decision node, implementing the
algorithm for CPLB-entry insertion could become complicated. Thus, handling the kernel
case might require a C implementation.
CPLB Protection Violation
The default cause for CPLB Protection Violation exceptions is an access from user mode.
As we consider each raise from kernel mode a bug, which is not expected, this path can be
treated in a C function.
As for CPLB Miss, user handling can be deferred to an interrupt of low priority. This
is especially interesting because it offers the possibility to call CPLB Miss user handling
directly after removing the kernel CPLB entry (see also ’Fixed CPLB Entries’ under sec-
tion 3.2.2). Since this part of the CPLB Miss handler does also belong to Ê, it is executed
in the same ISR, and no additional latency occurs to other interrupts as these own higher
priorities.
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Figure 3.11: analysing the CPLB Miss handler
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Figure 3.12: analysing the CPLB Protection Violation handler
Michael Ulbricht 35
3 Design
Multiple CPLB Hits
The Multiple CPLB Hits exception handler offers less potential to reduce interrupt latency.
However, we are able to implement the structure of the main path in assembler, while the
unexpected kernel bug case can be realized in C.
find first
affected CPLB
remove second
CPLB-entry
find second
affected CPLB
remove first
CPLB-entry
Exception Handler for
Multiple CPLB Hits
 yes
   no
bug in kernel
(kernel oops)
CPLB belongs
to domain?
CPLB belongs
to domain?
 yes
   no
remove CPLB entries
and kernel oops
Ë
Ì
Figure 3.13: analysing the Multiple CPLB Hits handler
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After the principle design choices have been described at length, the following details
about their actual implementation are presented in a condensed form. In addition, we
can only handle some of the main aspects and critical issues. However, those files of the
uClinux project which have been modified or newly added are listed in appendix A.
The implementation described below has been developed and tested on a ADDS-BF537-
STAMP board. As it has to be regarded prototypical, it is intended for use with this plat-
form and the Blackfin ADSP-BF537 revision 0.2.
4.1 Exception Handler for CPLB Miss
As the following issues relate to the Blackfin architecture, most of them do only con-
cern files below linux-2.6.x/arch/blackfin/. Unless otherwise stated, paths
are given relative to this directory.
Even if section 3.4 describes an approach for subdividing the CPLB exception handlers
into different parts, this basic implementation starts with a C-realization according to the
monolithic flow charts provided by section 3.2. The three CPLB exception handlers,
CPLB Miss, CPLB Protection Violation, and Multiple CPLB Hits are implemented in
mm/fault.c. Due to the limited time, an optimized revision is still outstanding.
4.1.1 Exception Entry
Whereas CPLB exception handling is done in C, entry code has to be written in assembler.
The according file for the Blackfin architecture is mach-common/entry.S.
In order to call an exception handler, uClinux uses the table _extable, which contains one
entry for each value the EXCAUSE field of the SEQSTAT register can take. Thus firstly,
the according entries for the CPLB exceptions have to be relocated to the their new han-
dlers. The addresses given in listing 4.1 do not belong to C-functions, but point to assem-
bler routines, which prepare the actual function call. They are subdivided into a handler
specific and a common section, as shown in listings 4.2 and 4.3.
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945 .long _ex_dcplb_prot /* 0x23 - Data CPLB Protection Violation */
.long _ex_trap_c /* 0x24 - Data access misaligned */
.long _ex_trap_c /* 0x25 - Unrecoverable Event */
.long _ex_dcplb_miss /* 0x26 - Data CPLB Miss */
.long _ex_dcplb_mult /* 0x27 - Data CPLB Multiple Hits */
953 .long _ex_icplb_prot /* 0x2B - Instruction CPLB protection Violation */
.long _ex_icplb_miss /* 0x2C - Instruction CPLB miss */
.long _ex_icplb_mult /* 0x2D - Instruction CPLB Multiple Hits */
Listing 4.1: mach-common/entry.S - _extable
As DCPLB entry has to cope with hardware anomaly 05000261, where anomaly denotes
that the current processor revision acts other than specified, ICPLB Miss entry has been
chosen for example. For a description of the anomaly and its workaround see [AL06].
159 ENTRY(_ex_icplb_miss)
P5.l = _do_cplb_miss_c;
P5.h = _do_cplb_miss_c;
R7 = ICPLB_OFFSET (Z);
163 jump.s _cplb_common;
Listing 4.2: mach-common/entry.S - handler-specific entry code
This short routine does just set the address of the C-function _do_cplb_miss_c(), which is
commonly used for ICPLB and DCPLBMiss exceptions. The distinction between instruc-
tion and data is made by the global variable _mmr_offset which is set through register R7
in the common section.
171 _cplb_common:
172 P4.l = _mmr_offset;
P4.h = _mmr_offset;
[P4] = R7;
/* disable DCPLBs (and thus data caching) */
177 P4.l = lo(DMEM_CONTROL);
P4.h = hi(DMEM_CONTROL);
R6 = [P4];
bitclr(R6, ENICPLB_P); /* ENDCPLB = 0 */
CLI R7;
182 SSYNC; /* SSYNC required before writing to DMEM_CONTROL. */
.align 8;
[P4] = R6;
SSYNC;
STI R7;
201 SAVE_ALL_SYS
R0 = SP; /* pt_regs */
204
SP += -12;
call (P5);
SP += 12;
209 RESTORE_ALL_SYS
Listing 4.3: mach-common/entry.S - common entry code
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In addition, this section disables the DCPLBs and, in dependence on anomaly 05000263,
the ICPLBs (see section 4.3.3). Thereafter, we push the processor context to the stack and
call the handler function. Of course, after return, CPLB states and processor context have
to be restored. Finally, the exception mode is left.
4.1.2 Find corresponding VMA
The principle steps have already been described in section ’Access from User Domain’ on
page 21. Whereas most of these steps just consist of pointer references, the first one does
require a bit more attention. It is handled in function get_task().
121 static inline struct task_struct *get_task(void)
{
unsigned long sp;
struct thread_info *ti;
126 /* RETN contains kernel mode stack pointer */
__asm__ ("%0 = RETN;": "=&d"(sp):
);
/* as the sp contained the value 001fa000 one time
131 * (stack wasn’t written yet?), we try sp-1 here
*/
ti = (struct thread_info *)((sp-1) & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1));
return ti->task;
136 }
Listing 4.4: mm/fault.c - get_task()
In kernel space the thread_info structure of the current process normally is obtained by
using the macro current. But as it references the register SP, which holds the pointer to
exception mode stack in our case, to receive the pointer to kernel mode stack, this macro is
not usable. Thus we have to use the register RETN, where the pointer to the current kernel
mode stack has been stored at exception entry. For details about why we can use the kernel
mode stack to get the thread_info structure see section 2.1.4.
4.1.3 Caching Strategy
Determining the caching strategy and setting the corresponding properties of the CPLB
entry is the last step before we can insert the new entry. This procedure is carried out by
the function set_cache_strategy(), which is defined at line 347 in mm/fault.c.
Section ’Caching Strategy’ on page 22 generally states that the caching strategy is
determined from uClinux’s memory regions. It might confuse that, in practice,
set_cache_strategy() searches linearly through uClinux’s Page Descriptor Tables (see sec-
tion 2.2.2). But as uClinux derives instruction and data PDT from the memory regions
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defined in linux-2.6.x/include/asm-blackfin/cplbinit.h, any changes
to the memory regions effect the settings in CPLB Miss.
Besides setting the caching strategy, we are able to use the memory regions to restrict the
page granularity in the first 4MB of RAM to 1MB. We need to do this in order to fix the
CPLB entry for the first megabyte (see ’Covering Exception Handlers’ Memory’ under
3.2.4). Therefore, an additional memory region has been introduced and the start address
of the next region has been shifted to 1M:
42 enum
{ZERO_P, L1I_MEM, L1D_MEM, SDRAM_EXCEPT, SDRAM_KERN, SDRAM_RAM_MTD, SDRAM_DMAZ, RES_MEM,
ASYNC_MEM, L2_MEM};
124 {
.start = 0x00000000,
.end = SIZE_1M,
.psize = SIZE_1M,
#if (defined(CONFIG_BLKFIN_CACHE) && defined(ANOMALY_05000263))
129 .attr = INITIAL_T | SWITCH_T | D_CPLB,
#else
.attr = INITIAL_T | SWITCH_T | I_CPLB | D_CPLB,
#endif
.i_conf = SDRAM_IGENERIC,
134 .d_conf = SDRAM_DGENERIC,
.valid = 1,
.name = "SDRAM Exception",
},
{
139 .start = SIZE_1M,
Listing 4.5: cplbinit.h - memory region for exception space
4.1.4 CPLB Layout
The CPLB exception handlers rely on the initial CPLB layout which is generated out of
those memory regions whose .attr field has INITIAL_T set. Thus, at the moment, suc-
cessful operation highly depends on uClinux’s configuration options, because the CPLB
handlers will treat the first two ICPLBs and the first two DCPLBs as fixed, no matter which
CPLB entries have been inserted.
uClinux installs initial CPLB entries according to the sequence defined in line 43 of list-
ing 4.5 in kernel/setup.c. In order to get the two fixed entries filled with one entry
covering the SRAM address range and one entry covering the exception handlers mem-
ory, the kernel option CONFIG_DEBUG_HUNT_FOR_ZERO (’Kernel hacking’->’Catch
NULL pointer reads/writes’) must not and BLKFIN_CACHE and BLKFIN_DCACHE
(’Blackfin Processor Options’->’Enable ICACHE’/’Enable DCACHE’) must be set.
Additionally, the option BLKFIN_WT (’Blackfin Processor Options’->’Policy’->’Write
through’) has to be enabled. With write back, memory protection is not working.
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4.2 Exception Handler for CPLB Protection Violation
4.2.1 Find affected CPLB
Finding the affected CPLB as required by the CPLB Protection Violation Handler is real-
ized in function find_cplb(), which is defined in mm/fault.c at line 400. It receives two
parameters: an address (addr) and the number of the CPLB where to start (num). As only
one CPLB is affected in case of a CPLB Protection Violation, this handler calls find_cplb()
once. In order to skip fixed entries, num is set to 2. The actual search is performed linearly,
comparing each CPLB entry with the given address.
The decision to avoid the bit field FAULT of the registers ICPLB_STATUS and DC-
PLB_STATUS, which already holds the affected CPLB (see page 6-61 in [PR06]), has
been made to provide a solution for both DCPLBs and ICPLBs. As ICPLB_STATUS is
affected by hardware anomaly 05000260, which is described in Silicon Anomaly List for
Blackfin ADSP-BF537 [AL06], its FAULT field is not usable.
Afterwards, it turned out that for silicon revision 0.2 ICPLB handling is not applicable
at all. See section 4.3.3. Thus, it would also be possible to implement the faster I/DC-
PLB_STATUS solution.
4.2.2 Interface for Measuring
The following piece of code shows the core of CPLB Protection Violation handling. It
is also the place where an additional interface is inserted if MEASURE is defined. This
interface is used for performance measurement in section 5.1.2.
502 /* from user mode */
else {
/* user CPLB entry? */
if (!(read_cplb_data(num) & CPLB_LOCK)) {
/* good area, but bad access */
507 force_sig_info_fault(SEGV_ACCERR, fault_addr);
}
/* fixed CPLB entry? */
else if (num < 2) {
#ifdef MEASURE
512 if (!measure_control(fault_addr, cplb_status))
#endif
/* bad area */
force_sig_info_fault(SEGV_MAPERR, fault_addr);
}
517 /* remove kernel CPLB entry */
else
remove_cplb(num);
}
Listing 4.6: mm/fault.c - interface for measuring
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In short, its functionality is as follows. If a user process accesses address 0x0000000C,
it does not receive a signal, but the access is allowed. In case of a read access, all CPLB
exception counters and information about the time spent in them are cleared. In addition
a user time stamp is set before the current exception returns. In case of a write access,
a second user time stamp is set on handler entry and the previous states of counters and
timing variables are freezed. Thereafter, the user can collect these information by reading
the file /proc/faultinfo.
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Figure 4.1: interface for CPLB exception measurement
4.3 Associated Requirements
4.3.1 Covering Exception Handlers’ Memory
In order to relocate the exception handlers’ memory to the first megabyte of RAM, we
have to modify the Master linker script for the Blackfin architecture, which is located in
kernel/vmlinux.lds.S. As the boot loader immediately begins to write the kernel
image, which has to start with the kernel’s code, behind the label CONFIG_BOOT_LOAD,
the only possibility to add a data section is using the former zero pointer gap.
Therefore, two new memory sections have been introduced in this place: .except.data and
.except.rodata. These belong to the memory range ram_except, which has been newly de-
fined at line 45 as visible in listing 4.8.
53 SECTIONS
{
.data_except :
{
57 __sdata_except = .;
*(.except.data)
*(.except.rodata)
__edata_except = .;
} > ram_except
62
. = CONFIG_BOOT_LOAD;
.text :
Listing 4.7: kernel/vmlinux.lds.S - new sections
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43 MEMORY
{
ram_except : ORIGIN = 0, LENGTH = CONFIG_BOOT_LOAD
ram : ORIGIN = CONFIG_BOOT_LOAD, LENGTH = (CONFIG_MEM_SIZE * 1024 * 1024)
47 - (CONFIG_BOOT_LOAD)
Listing 4.8: kernel/vmlinux.lds.S - new memory range
Because none of the exception handlers is allowed to raise a second exception, relocating
exception handlers’ memory does not only refer to the CPLB exception handlers. Thus,
all of the data used in mach-common/entry.S has to be relocated.
This data consists of a stack and variables, which need not be initialized, and tables, which
are read-only and thus have to be initialized. The former can be easily displaced by insert-
ing one of the new section definitions (line 1301 in listing 4.9), whereas the latter require
either to be included in the kernel image or to be written by a initialization function of the
kernel section .init.
As a first approach, the easier way has been chosen, and _extable and _sys_call_table have
been relocated to .rodata, which belongs to the kernel code section .text. At the moment,
this definition is applicable as the tables lie inside the first megabyte. But as the distance
to the 1MB-boundary is rather short, this should be changed in the future.
903 .section .rodata
ALIGN
905 _extable:
/* entry for each EXCAUSE[5:0]
1301 .section .except.data
_exception_stack:
1304 .rept 1022
.long 0;
.endr
Listing 4.9: mach-common/entry.S - relocating data
The actual position of _extable and _sys_call_table can be determined from
linux-2.6.x/System.map, which is, in parts, displayed on the next page. The five
parts describe five different types of memory.
The first one (top left) includes data which has already been relocated to the exception han-
dler’s memory range. As this range has become larger than 1KB, CONFIG_BOOT_LOAD
had to be adjusted to address 0x00002000. When invoking make menuconfig, the cor-
responding configuration option can be found under ’Blackfin Processor Options’->’Board
customizations’->’Kernel load address for booting’. As described in [BLD] on page ’ker-
nel_space_memory_allocation’, this offset can be freely customized to our needs.
The second (beneath) shows C-functions which belong to mm/fault.c. The position of
these symbols and those of other functions which get called from there, like printk, do not
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have to be tracked because CPLBs are disabled before the corresponding handler function
is called.
The third part (top right) provides the code locations for the assembler routines in
mach-common/entry.S. They have to reside inside the first 1MB of RAM. The fourth
one proves that _extable and _sys_call_table have to be relocated later, and finally, the last
part contains symbols for static variables which belong to functions of part two.
linux-2.6.x/System.map:
0000000000000000 d _exception_stack
0000000000000000 D __sdata_except
0000000000000ff8 D _exception_start_time
0000000000001000 d _exception_stack_top
0000000000001000 d _excpt_saved_imask
...
0000000000001070 D _time_in_mult
0000000000001078 D __edata_except
0000000000002000 T __start
0000000000008f18 T ___flush_cplb_range
0000000000008fe8 t _print_debug_info_post
0000000000008fec t _print_debug_info_pre
0000000000009020 t _die
00000000000090c0 t _force_sig_info_fault
0000000000009110 T _do_cplb_miss_c
00000000000093a0 T ___flush_cplb
0000000000009424 T _do_cplb_prot_c
0000000000009578 T _do_cplb_mult_c
000000000000a038 T _ex_dcplb_mult
...
000000000000a0b8 T _ex_icplb_prot
000000000000a0c6 t _cplb_common
000000000000a1f0 T _ex_spinlock
000000000000a204 T _ex_syscall
...
000000000000a388 T _ex_trap_c
000000000000a3d8 T _exception_to_level5
000000000000a504 T _trap
...
000000000000a928 T _init_exception_buff
00000000000f4590 t _extable
00000000000f4694 T _sys_call_table
00000000001271a8 d _icplb_last_insert.10416
00000000001271aa d _dcplb_last_insert.10415
4.3.2 Flushing CPLBs
The two new functions __flush_cplb() and __flush_cplb_range(), which we discussed under
’Flushing CPLBs’ on page 29, are implemented in mm/fault.c at line 723 and 758. In
order to be accessible through the generic kernel interface, the previous stub functions
in the header file linux-2.6.x/include/asm-blackfin/tlbflush.h, which
looked like __flush_tlb_one, had to be substituted.
14 extern void __flush_cplb(void);
#define flush_tlb() __flush_cplb()
17 static inline void __flush_tlb_one(unsigned long addr)
{
BUG();
}
41 extern void __flush_cplb_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end);
#define flush_tlb_range(a,b,c) __flush_cplb_range(b,c)
Listing 4.10: tlbflush.h - TLB flush kernel interface
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The corresponding calls to __flush_cplb_range() have been inserted into linux-2.6.x/
mm/nommu.c, where three functions are affected: put_vma(), do_mremap(), and
remap_pfn_range().
Additionally, the function __flush_cplb() has been introduced to the macro which
implements the process switch for the Blackfin architecture. It is situated in
linux-2.6.x/include/asm-blackfin/system.h
244 #define switch_to(prev,next,last) \
do { \
246 memcpy (&prev->thread_info->l1_task_info, L1_SCRATCH_TASK_INFO, \
sizeof *L1_SCRATCH_TASK_INFO); \
memcpy (L1_SCRATCH_TASK_INFO, &next->thread_info->l1_task_info, \
sizeof *L1_SCRATCH_TASK_INFO); \
(last) = resume (prev, next); \
251 flush_tlb(); \
} while (0)
Listing 4.11: system.h - process switch macro
4.3.3 Static ICPLB Handling
Revision 0.2 of the Blackfin DSP suffers from a fatal anomaly. It it is given the number
05000263 and is described in [AL06] and on page ’faq’ in [BLD] (see entry ’BF533 board
only shows 60meg free with 128meg’). In short, the problem is as follows: due to a bug in
the processor core, hardware loops are misbehaving if they raise a CPLB exception. Thus,
dynamic ICPLB handling is not possible because uClinux relies on hardware loops. As a
workaround, uClinux tries to cover as much memory as possible with 4MB-CPLB entries
and treats them as fixed.
Therefore, protection of memory against unauthorized execution is not possible. At start
up time, according to the uClinux’s workaround, all installed CPLB entries provide the
right to execute instructions to both kernel and user. Since the CPLB exception handlers
rely on uClinux’s initial CPLB layout, no further ICPLB exceptions can arise.
By the way, the definitions for the initial access rights of DCPLBs have been
changed in linux-2.6.x/include/asm-blackfin/mach-bf537/bf537.h
at line 245.
Source code which handles ICPLBs independently from ICPLB exceptions, has been mod-
ified by preprocessor directives. This applies to disabling ICPLBs at CPLB exception
handler entry and flushing CPLBs. If the macro ANOMALY_05000263 is defined, the
corresponding lines are omitted.
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5.1 Memory Protection
As already expressed in sections 3.3 and 3.4, there are two factors which determine if
Memory Protection can be applied in an embedded operating system like uClinux: the
incurred overhead and the interrupt latency. According to these requirements, the follow-
ing sections will hopefully serve as a basis for the decision about application and further
development.
5.1.1 General Benchmarks
As the effort induced by managing memory access control might be considered more than
substantial, we should start with some common benchmarks. Comparing their execution
timings in conjunction with a patched uClinux exercising Memory Protection (indicated
by MP) and an original one (noMP) gives a first impression about how serious the CPLB
exception handlers effect overall performance.
All performance tests are run on an ADDS-BF537-STAMP board with I- and D-CACHE
enabled. Since the CPLB Miss handler does only support write-through mode, this is
selected for both uClinux versions. In addition, the option ’Locate interrupt entry code in
L1 Memory’ has to be disabled.
 
root:~> cat /proc/cpuinfo
CPU: ADSP-BF537 Rev. 0.2
MMU: none
FPU: none
Core Clock: 500000000 Hz
System Clock: 100000000 Hz
BogoMips: 995.32
Calibration: 497664000 loops
Board Name: ADDS-BF537-STAMP
Board Memory: 64 MB
Kernel Memory: 64 MB
I-CACHE: ON
D-CACHE: ON (write-through)
I-CACHE Size: 16KB
D-CACHE Size: 32KB
I-CACHE Setup: 4 Sub-banks/4 Ways, 32 Lines/Way
D-CACHE Setup: 2 Super-banks/4 Sub-banks/2 Ways, 64 Lines/Way 
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Unless otherwise stated, we use the basic configuration of uClinux MP as it is described
in chapter 3. If benchmarks are to be reproduced, the according pre-built kernel im-
age linux_mp is provided at the enclosed CD in the directory images/. It corre-
sponds to the given configuration of the source code in uClinux-mp/. The differ-
ing configuration options for the other uClinux MP variants (linux_mp_measure,
linux_mp_measure_intlat) are given in appendix A.
Likewise, the CD contains the source code for uClinux noMP in uClinux-nomp/
and the according kernel images in images/. Its default configuration (build into
linux_nomp) is used in most situations. In order to run the same benchmarks as for
uClinux MP and make results comparable, some configuration options have been changed
with respect to the original uClinux 2006R2 distribution, and built support has been added
for some additional executable files and scripts. Also see appendix A.
The first benchmark to run is called ’whetstone’. It has been written to simulate floating
point numerical applications and is, like every benchmark used in here, included in all
kernel images. Thus, no extra compile procedure is required and benchmarking solely
reduces to the following:
MP:
 
root:~> whetstone
Loops: 1000, Iterations: 1, Duration: 33 sec.
C Converted Double Precision Whetstones: 3.0 MIPS 
Normally, using these kinds of benchmarks is highly dependent on the actual compile
options. But as, in our case, the built process is identical for uClinux MP and noMP we do
not need to pay attention to this matter. For details see page ’Whetstone’ in [BLD].
noMP:
 
root:~> whetstone
Loops: 1000, Iterations: 1, Duration: 33 sec.
C Converted Double Precision Whetstones: 3.0 MIPS 
As this result is a bit surprising, we should try another common benchmark called ’dhry-
stone’. Even if it is not a good choice in order to compare different embedded systems
(see page ’Dhrystone’ in [BLD]), it does fit our needs in gaining a first impression of two
similar systems.
MP:
 
root:~> dhrystone
Dhrystone Benchmark, Version 2.1 (Language: C)
Program compiled without ’register’ attribute
Please give the number of runs through the benchmark: 10000000
Execution starts, 10000000 runs through Dhrystone
Execution ends
Microseconds for one run through Dhrystone: 4.0
Dhrystones per Second: 251067.0 
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noMP:
 
root:~> dhrystone
Dhrystone Benchmark, Version 2.1 (Language: C)
Program compiled without ’register’ attribute
Please give the number of runs through the benchmark: 10000000
Execution starts, 10000000 runs through Dhrystone
Execution ends
Microseconds for one run through Dhrystone: 4.0
Dhrystones per Second: 251572.3 
The results of these two benchmarks show that exercising memory protection is not gen-
erally inapplicable. Of course, the reason that MP and noMP are so close together lies in
the small amount of memory they are using; their main focus is CPU performance.
MP:
 
root:~> ./nbench
BYTEmark* Native Mode Benchmark ver. 2 (10/95)
Index-split by Andrew D. Balsa (11/97)
Linux/Unix* port by Uwe F. Mayer (12/96,11/97)
TEST : Iterations/sec. : Old Index : New Index
: : Pentium 90* : AMD K6/233*
--------------------:------------------:-------------:------------
NUMERIC SORT : 115.43 : 2.96 : 0.97
STRING SORT : 3.9094 : 1.75 : 0.27
BITFIELD : 4.4602e+07 : 7.65 : 1.60
FP EMULATION : 22.359 : 10.73 : 2.48
FOURIER : 20.368 : 0.02 : 0.01
ASSIGNMENT : 0.62598 : 2.38 : 0.62
IDEA : 352.39 : 5.39 : 1.60
HUFFMAN : 94.162 : 2.61 : 0.83
NEURAL NET : 0.022989 : 0.04 : 0.02
LU DECOMPOSITION : 0.61901 : 0.03 : 0.02
MEMORY INDEX : 0.644
INTEGER INDEX : 1.339
FLOATING-POINT INDEX: 0.017
Baseline (LINUX) : AMD K6/233*, 512 KB L2-cache, gcc 2.7.2.3, libc-5.4.38 
noMP:
 
root:~> ./nbench
BYTEmark* Native Mode Benchmark ver. 2 (10/95)
Index-split by Andrew D. Balsa (11/97)
Linux/Unix* port by Uwe F. Mayer (12/96,11/97)
TEST : Iterations/sec. : Old Index : New Index
: : Pentium 90* : AMD K6/233*
--------------------:------------------:-------------:------------
NUMERIC SORT : 116.4 : 2.99 : 0.98
STRING SORT : 3.8611 : 1.73 : 0.27
BITFIELD : 4.4961e+07 : 7.71 : 1.61
FP EMULATION : 22.655 : 10.87 : 2.51
FOURIER : 20.277 : 0.02 : 0.01
ASSIGNMENT : 1.4414 : 5.48 : 1.42
IDEA : 350.74 : 5.36 : 1.59
HUFFMAN : 94.056 : 2.61 : 0.83
NEURAL NET : 0.023033 : 0.04 : 0.02
LU DECOMPOSITION : 0.7722 : 0.04 : 0.03
Michael Ulbricht 49
5 Performance Evaluation
MEMORY INDEX : 0.849
INTEGER INDEX : 1.344
FLOATING-POINT INDEX: 0.018
Baseline (LINUX) : AMD K6/233*, 512 KB L2-cache, gcc 2.7.2.3, libc-5.4.38 
A benchmark which slightly incorporates memory access measurement is ’nbench’. Un-
like the previous two, it was not included in uClinux 2006R2’s build process. Thus, the
source files, which were already present in the directory user/nbench/, had to be made
accessible to uClinux’s configuration, at first. Furthermore, some changes to the project’s
Makefile were required.
At least this benchmark reveals the weak point of memory protection. According to the
documentation in [BY], the descriptions of the two tests which incurred the most per-
formance loss read as follows: Assignment ’moves through large integer arrays in both
row-wise and column-wise fashion’ and LU decomposition is a ’floating-point test that
moves through arrays in both row-wise and column-wise fashion’.
As long as applications keep their memory footprint small, the induced overhead is neg-
ligible. This is given if memory accesses refer to a limited set of 4KB pages which the
Blackfin’s CPLBs are able to hold along with the kernel entries.
Even if processes move linearly through large amounts of memory, the performance loss is
still slight. The critical operation, as performed by column-wise movement in conjunction
with large rows, is randomly hitting many pages in short sequence.
5.1.2 Memory Access
According to the latest findings, the next tests will deal with scattered memory accesses,
especially measuring the number of raised CPLB exceptions and the time spent in the
according handlers. These benchmarks may also serve as a starting point for further im-
provements and optimizations.
Matrix Benchmark
As row-wise memory accesses occur, for example, in conjunction with matrix multiplica-
tions, this is the benchmark situation to start with. It involves addressing three matrices:
one of the two factors and the product in linear (row-wise) and the second factor in column-
wise order. The according benchmark has been written as part of this diploma thesis and
is situated in both uClinux versions under user/cplbbench/.
It allows timing measurements of two fashions. The first one solely makes use of Blackfin’s
CYCLES registers, which increment at each cycle of the core clock (CCLK), 500,000,000
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times a second, and enable us to do precise measurements under uClinux MP and noMP.
The second additionally involves the CPLB exception handlers and provides reliable in-
formation about the number of raised exceptions and the time spent in exception handlers.
See section 4.2.2 for the realization of the CPLB exception handler’s measure interface.
MP: 
root:~> cplbbench_mat 64 576 64
measuring without CPLB exception interface:
size run 1 avg run 2-10
[ 64x 64]=[ x ]x[ x ]: 17141300 16957156.6
[ 128x 128]=[ x ]x[ x ]: 2083354395 2083388620.0
[ 192x 192]=[ x ]x[ x ]: 9770671220 9769633724.4
[ 256x 256]=[ x ]x[ x ]: 38364630215 38367978863.9
[ 320x 320]=[ x ]x[ x ]: 91965978350 91964694789.4
[ 384x 384]=[ x ]x[ x ]: 183984320315 183983601314.4
[ 448x 448]=[ x ]x[ x ]: 346394990745 346374988369.4
[ 512x 512]=[ x ]x[ x ]: 19763907005 19763701920.0
[ 576x 576]=[ x ]x[ x ]: 185424571795 185428402637.8 
noMP: 
64 576 64
xception interface:
run 1 avg run 2-10
16928695 16820260.7
274676720 274511927.0
900330835 900250680.3
2486700470 2486725764.8
4910676410 4910623944.9
8402812990 8402807393.2
13446260105 13446290104.8
19765930365 19765633362.1
28539451990 28539339925.0 
The given command cplbbench_mat multiplies matrices of sizes ranging from 16KB
(64x64 elements) to 1296KB (576x576). Each calculation is done 10 times. As the result
of the first run is significant larger, especially with smaller values, it has been excluded
from average and is not used for further calculations. This difference chiefly depends on
the instruction cache.
As far as these results are regarded, we have to put up with an additional overhead for
memory protection which is, in the case of a 448x448 matrix, about 25 times the original
execution time. But on the other hand, computing a 512x512 matrix takes only slightly
longer than doing the same with uClinux noMP. The reason for this is as simple as calcu-
lating the actual size of a nxn matrix:
s= n2 sizeo f (unsigned long)
As sizeo f (unsigned long) equals 4 byte for the Blackfin, the decline in execution time
happens when the size of the matrix increases to 1MB and the CPLB Miss handler is able
to use a large CPLB entry.
Involving the CPLB Exception Handlers
Another interesting question, especially when trying to reduce the negative effect of mem-
ory protection, is about the actual number of exceptions which come to rise as well as their
duration. Running the following benchmarks requires the CPLB exception handlers to be
build with MEASURE defined. The according kernel image is linux_mp_measure.
Turning cplbbench_mat into exception mode is done by a fourth command line ar-
gument, which has to be unequal to zero. The following snippet of the program’s output
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shows the results for two interesting matrix sizes. The first one gives the extreme number
of CPLB Misses in the worst case of this series and the second reveals what happens if
large 1MB CPLB entries can be used. This is an interesting fact when thinking about the
kernel-user approach (see section 3.3.2).
 
root:~> cplbbench_mat 64 576 64 1
MEASURE has to be defined for CPLB exception handling!
See /arch/blackfin/mm/fault.c If not. this will end up in a SIGSEGV!
size run 1 avg run 2-10
[ 448x 448]=[ x ]x[ x ]: 369150685924 369126851364.6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
exceptions: sum Miss (kern) Miss (user) Prot Mult
count (1): 46145643 373044 45768716 2115 1768
(avg 2-10): 46145664.6 373015.8 45768767.6 2134.4 1746.8
cycles (1): 351222997769 2241826958 348963188193 9411961 8570657
(avg 2-10): 351199296820.8 2241575928.7 348939743398.9 9496899.3 8480593.9
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ 512x 512]=[ x ]x[ x ]: 19773460579 19773064274.6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
exceptions: sum Miss (kern) Miss (user) Prot Mult
count (1): 892 172 509 110 101
(avg 2-10): 872.1 168.9 494.8 107.0 101.4
cycles (1): 5943323 1266244 3672655 510557 493867
(avg 2-10): 5810045.9 1246806.8 3572941.0 494838.7 495459.4 
Additionally, it provides us with information about the average duration of each distinct
CPLB exception handler. We just need to divide the cycles of the handler by its counter
reading. As the resulting values seem to partly depend on the size of the matrices, they
are listed in table 5.1. According to the above call to cplbbench_mat, size is given in
per-row elements of the matrix and timing values are given in core clock cycles.
size 64 128 192 256 320 384 448 512 576
Miss (kernel) 6342 6055 6009 6051 6008 6006 6009 7382 6057
Miss (user) 5955 5966 5928 7669 7602 7439 7624 7221 6273
Protection V. 4551 4519 4483 4469 4464 4464 4449 4625 4494
Multiple Hits 5466 4891 4861 4896 4840 4832 4855 4886 4852
Table 5.1: average duration of CPLB exception handlers in CCLK cycles
However, this variant of the benchmark is mainly intended to provide an objective data ba-
sis for comparing different versions of the CPLB exception handlers. Due to the modifica-
tions when MEASURE is defined and the fact that retrieving the time stamps is completely
committed to the CPLB exception handlers for being synchronous with their counters, the
results differ slightly from the previous ones. For this reason, it is, e.g., not possible to
subtract the time spent in exception handlers from the whole time of matrix multiplication
and compare the result to the uClinux noMP value.
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Vector Benchmark
As matrix multiplication requires three matrices and is, at least in case of a simple im-
plementation, an algorithm of third order, it is not really suited to provide clear and pre-
sentable benchmark results. Another possibility is summing up the elements of a vector. If
we do this linearly, the timing results reflect the best case and if we choose a step width of
4KB, this addresses the worst case. Now, unlike matrix multiplication, linear access and
worst case access are separated and can be treated independently.
The according benchmark is called cplbbench_vec and provides the same functional-
ity as cplbbench_mat. In preparation of the following diagrams, it has been invoked
in conjunction with linux_mp and linux_nomp. The following output is provided to
give a short impression of the benchmark’s run under uClinux MP. All further explanations
refer to the diagrams. For underlying data see appendix A.
MP:
 
root:~> cplbbench_vec 32768 1048576 32768
size linear access worst case access
run 1 avg run 2-10 run 1 avg run 2-10
S[ 32768]: 713164 696392.0 174097104 173861539.6
S[ 65536]: 1409889 1359923.1 348946554 349064280.9
S[ 98304]: 2073914 2035012.1 519577049 519455573.0
S[ 131072]: 2987264 2927402.4 918896849 918828246.6
S[ 163840]: 3698639 3654365.2 1146439184 1146596922.1
S[ 196608]: 4435776 4383655.1 1374345064 1374087363.4
S[ 229376]: 5163249 5110882.3 1602000779 1601727368.6
S[ 262144]: 4069141 4017640.7 33769614 33687772.9
S[ 294912]: 4788094 4758768.8 278350514 278579010.2
The figure 5.1 focuses on the linear access situation.
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Figure 5.1: cplbbench_vec: linear access
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The green data points refer to the benchmark situation without memory protection. Ac-
cording to the easy algorithm of vector summation, these are arranged on a straight line.
As already mentioned in section 5.1.1, timings for linear accesses with memory protection,
depicted by yellow data points, do only grow little above those for uClinux noMP. As
they are even declining if large CPLB entries can be used instead of 4KB entries, the
proportional overhead reaches its maximum for a vector size slightly smaller than 1MB.
With respect to the given values this is an overhead of about 45% for the 229376-element
vector.
Even if 45% are not negligible on their own, they become nothing in comparison with the
overhead in the worst case access situation. It is given by the red data points in figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: cplbbench_vec: worst case access
There is no need to give percentages to realize that an application which primarily refer-
ences large chunks of memory by scattered accesses can not be run on a uClinux system
with user-user protection. Either an efficient kernel-user approach is required or these pro-
grams have to allocate multiples of 1MB. To be more precise, an according allocation has
to look like: malloc((size+0x00100000) & 0xFFF00000 - 4)
0x03000000
Free Memory (in Buddy Lists)
Memory used by the Kernel
VMAs
Kernel Mode Stacks
wasted Memory (power-of-2 allocation)
0x03200000
Figure 5.3: power-of-two allocation
If ’ - 4 ’ was left out, the default malloc implementation in conjunction with the power-
of-two allocator would waste about 1MB.
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However, if a program uses small vector sizes of at most 52KB (13 pages), the according
CPLB entries fit into the DCPLBs and scattered memory accesses are not a problem. Of
course, this requires that only one vector is handled at a time.
MP:
 
root:~> cplbbench_vec 512 32768 512
size linear access worst case access
run 1 avg run 2-10 run 1 avg run 2-10
S[ 512]: 14396 5519.7
S[ 1024]: 21581 10639.6 277346 274980.6
S[ 1536]: 27999 15780.8 283276 274938.2
S[ 12800]: 251144 199330.3 645374 553532.9
S[ 13312]: 264586 240657.9 665434 640425.8
S[ 13824]: 275751 246596.9 33633634 40640664.6
S[ 14336]: 288304 309950.2 41377324 40538331.0
S[ 32256]: 715971 676084.8 173149594 172813095.0
S[ 32768]: 758504 694185.0 180067554 180106430.1 
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Figure 5.4: cplbbench_vec: small vectors
5.1.3 Interrupt Latency
The second main performance issue, especially with embedded systems, is interrupt la-
tency. Even if the approach which is documented in section 3.4 has not yet been imple-
mented, this section tries to give a brief overview on the current situation.
A proposal for measuring interrupt latency in uClinux on the Blackfin is submitted on
page ’interrupt_latency’ in Blackfin Linux Docs [BLD]. The appropriate driver has been
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included in the kernel images linux_mp_intlat and linux_nomp_intlat (see
appendix A).
It uses the watch dog timer to raise an interrupt at a definite point in time. Then, in the
according ISR a second time is measured. After that, we can read the difference from
/proc/timer_latency. In order to get a couple of readings, the following script
does this repeatedly:
1 while true
do
3 echo "1" > /proc/timer_latency
# watch dog timer in 5 sec
sleep 6
cat /proc/timer_latency >> lats
echo >> lats
8 done
Listing 5.1: measuring interrupt latency
As long lists of values would be exhausting, the results are summarized in table 5.2.
Interrupt latency has been measured 100 times over a period of 10 minutes for each
of the four different operating conditions. Where a load was required, the command
cplbbench_mat 1024 1024 1 was run in parallel.
MP MP with load noMP noMP with load
latency in cycles µs cycles µs cycles µs cycles µs
max. 4560 9.1 9625 19.3 4164 8.3 4909 9.8
means 2405 4.8 8140 16.3 2438 4.9 2804 5.6
min. 2100 4.2 7655 15.3 2306 4.6 2446 4.9
Table 5.2: interrupt latency
It should be added that the maximum in case of MP and noMP without load represent only
one or two peak values.
5.1.4 Security
After some of the benchmark results have been somewhat disappointing, this is a good
place to remind us about the reason for which all of these efforts have been made. For this
purpose, two tiny tools have been added to the kernel images: peek and poke. These
enable us to read from or write to an arbitrary memory location as it may happen due to an
unexpected pointer value. The following command line outputs show that a single write
access can crash one particular process or even the entire system.
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5.1 Memory Protection
Causing a program crash:
noMP:
 
root:~> cplbbench_mat 1024 1024 1 &
31
root:~> measuring without CPLB exception interface:
size run 1 avg run 2-10
[1024x1024]=[ x ]x[ x ]:
root:~> poke 0x03608468 0xFFFFFFFF
tioningU0ndffefffintoeddd issnsx0tr08uc8
- May be used to emulate instructions that are not defined for
a particular processor implementation.
CURRENT PROCESS:
COMM=cplbbench_mat PID=31
TEXT = 0x03608040-0x0360c320 DATA = 0x0360c324-0x0360ce84
<0x00010c00> { _do_wait + 0x338 }
written!
root:~> ls
31: Illegal instruction
COM.DAT dev lib nbench sbin usr 
MP:
 
root:~> cat proc/maps
00280000-00300000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0
03608000-03610000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0
root:~> poke 0x03608468 0xFFFFFFFF
writing 0xffffffff to address 0x03608468
SIGSEGV
root:~> 
Causing a system crash:
noMP:
 
root:~> peek 0x000142E8
reading from address: 0x000142e8
result: 0x00001807
root:~> poke 0x000056D4 0x0000ABCD
writinUndx0ef0aind ed a irens 0tr00uc6dti
on
- May be used to emulate instructions that are not defined for
a particular processor implementation.
No Valid pid - Either things are really messed up, or you are in the kernel
return address: 0x000056d8; contents of [PC-16...PC+8]:
0167 6408 6fa6 322a 9320 3002 e300 9214
<0x00002216> { _real_start + 0x92 }
Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel exception 
MP:
 
root:~> peek 0x000142E8
reading from address: 0x000142e8
SIGSEGV
root:~> poke 0x000056D4 0x0000ABCD
writing 0x0000abcd to address 0x000056bc
SIGSEGV
root:~> 
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5 Performance Evaluation
5.2 RTAI and Lightweight RTAI
As indicated by chapter 1 ’Introduction’, providing memory access control to RTAI and
Lightweight RTAI has been intended a second step from the beginning. Now, having
finished a basic approach for uClinux, thus having completed the first step, there is no time
left to head for the next. Due to difficulties induced by anomalies and suppositions which
turned out to be wrong, implementing memory protection for uClinux took significantly
longer than expected.
5.3 Cache Configuration Interface
Likewise, implementing an experimental interface to uClinux in order to influence caching
of distinct memory areas has not been achieved yet.
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6 Conclusion and Outlook
With reference to the results presented in the previous chapter, achieving memory protec-
tion in uClinux has been a great deal. It has been a major step towards enhanced security
in embedded systems. On the other hand, benchmarking revealed that memory access con-
trol is not able to be an overall solution. Several applications may be affected by a severe
performance loss.
In the end, the decision on applying memory protection should be left to the developer of
the actual embedded system. For this reason, a final version, which is to be added to the
uClinux development tree, has to imply a set of configuration options. They should allow
to choose the kernel-user as well as the user-user solution. In addition, some options should
be provided to influence uClinux’s memory allocation scheme. This especially refers to
the separation of distinct kernel and user memory regions.
As this thesis realizes a basic approach, there are several issues left to future work:
• porting Lightweight RTAI to the Blackfin architecture
• introducing memory access control to RTAI and Lightweight RTAI
• realizing an interface to influence caching
• include memory protection into the uClinux distribution and make it configurable
• implementing the kernel-user approach
• deferring user handling to an interrupt of low priority
• using I/DCPLB_STATUS to find the affected CPLBs
• implementing an efficient CPLB victimization strategy
• introducing some kind of buffer for retrieving VMA access rights
• The Multiple CPLB Hits handler should not remove kernel entries.
Instead, it could shrink it to 1MB and expand it later.
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A Content ot the enclosed CD
The enclosed CD contains the following directories:
documents is the home of the files given in the bibliography on page 63.
images contains the kernel images which are referred to in chapter 5. They have been
built from the source codes given in uClinux-mp and uClinux-nomp.
linux_mp
This is the basic version of uClinux-mp. All necessary configuration changes have
been added to the vendor defaults for the product BF537-STAMP.
linux_mp_measure
In addition to the basic version, this one has been compiled with MEASURE defined
in mm/fault.c.
linux_mp_intlat
This image is used in conjunction with interrupt latency measurement. Therefore,
the interrupt latency test driver has been included by setting BFIN_TIMER_LATENCY
(’Device Drivers’->’Character devices’->’Blackfin 5xx interrupt latency test’).
linux_nomp
This is the basic verison of uClinux-nomp. It has been derived from uClinux-dist
by adding and modifying those files given in directory uClinux-nomp. The op-
tions which had to be changed in comparison to uClinux-dist can be obtained by
comparing the configuration files in uClinux-nomp/vendors/AnalogDevices/BF537-
STAMP with the original ones.
linux_nomp_intlat
See linux_mp_intlat.
measurement holds the full output of each benchmark run described in chapter 5.
misc presents the scripts which have been use in order to generate figure 3.7.
uClinux-dist contains the original source code of uClinux-dist 2006R2-RC2.
uClinux-mp comprises the whole source code of the augmented uClinux version in a
archive. The subdirectories do only contain files which have been added or changed.
uClinux-nomp holds the source code of a slightly adapted uClinux version without mem-
ory management. Likewise to uClinux-mp, it includes one archive and some subdi-
rectories.
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B Abbreviations
ADEOS Adaptive Domain Environment for Operating Systems
CPLB Cacheability Protection Lookaside Buffer
DCPLB Data CPLB
DMA Direct Memory Access
DSP Digital Signal Processor
ELF Executable and Linking Format
ICPLB Instruction CPLB
ISR interrupt service routine
MMU Memory Management Unit
PDT Page Descriptor Table
RAM Random Access Memory
RTAI RealTime Application Interface
SRAM Static RAM
TLB Translation Lookaside Buffer
VM Virtual Memory
VMA Virtual Memory Area
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